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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Victor Sasay petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ ruling that his conviction for aggravated 
identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) is a crime 
involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), thus making him 
removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Sasay 
asserts that aggravated identity theft is not a CIMT because it 
only criminalizes possession of another person’s identity 
documents and does not require the use or the intent to use the 
documents.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review.  
 
I. 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
 
Victor Sasay is a native and citizen of Sierra Leone.  He 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 2007.  In 2015, he was convicted of misdemeanor 
credit card fraud under Virginia law1 and sentenced to 175 
days’ imprisonment.2  In 2018, he was convicted in South 
 
1 Va. Code § 18.2-195(3). 




Dakota of aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and sentenced to 24 
months’ imprisonment.3  That conviction is the one at the 
center of this dispute.  It resulted from Sasay and his co-
defendants purchasing credit card numbers online and using 
counterfeit access devices to acquire hundreds of credit and 
debit cards from multiple stores across the Midwest.4   
 
A noncitizen, lawful permanent resident is removable 
when she or he is convicted of “two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct.”5  The Department of Homeland Security 
concluded that both of Sasay’s convictions were CIMTs and 
that they arose from separate criminal schemes.  Accordingly, 
DHS initiated removal proceedings.  Sasay applied for several 
forms of relief including asylum, withholding of removal, 
protection under the Convention Against Torture, and 
cancellation of removal.6   
 
3 Id. at 6. Although Sasay was convicted of aiding and 
abetting aggravated identity theft as opposed to aggravated 
identity theft, we treat the commission of those crimes the 
same when considering whether a criminal offense is a 
CIMT. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an offense 
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal.”); Matter of F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 783, 785 (BIA 1955) 
(“While the legal distinction between principal and accessory 
remains, an accessory before the fact is punishable in the 
same fashion as the principle by reference to the definition of 
the substantive offense and the penalty so imposed by the 
statute.” (citations omitted)). We will therefore refer to 
Sasay’s conviction as one of aggravated identity theft. 
4 A.R. at 755. For the reasons we discuss below, we can 
consider his plea agreement. 
5 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). See 
Smith v. Att’y Gen., 983 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2020). 
6 Sasay did not appeal the denial of asylum, withholding of 
removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Sasay appealed the 
Immigration Judge’s denial of cancellation of removal to the 
BIA, but he did not raise cancellation before this Court.  




Applying the so-called “categorical approach,” the 
Immigration Judge concluded that both of Sasay’s convictions 
were disqualifying CIMTs which did not arise from a single 
scheme.  The IJ reasoned that Sasay’s conviction for 
aggravated identity theft in violation of § 1028A(a)(1) satisfied 
the definition of a CIMT because it requires one to act 
knowingly and it also requires one to act with fraudulent intent 
or deceit.7 
 
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Sasay 
conceded that his Virginia conviction constituted a CIMT and 
that his two convictions did not arise from a single scheme.  
However, he argued that his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(a)(1) did not constitute a CIMT because the statute 
“is categorically overbroad and indivisible, as the minimum 
conduct required for a conviction under the statute is the mere 
possession of someone else’s documents without lawful 
authority.”8 
 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Sasay had 
committed two qualifying CIMTs.  The BIA concluded that § 
1028A(a)(1) “require[d] that the possession be ‘during and in 
relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c),’ 
such that there must be proof of an intent to use the 
identification unlawfully (and, indeed, feloniously).”9  It held 
that “all conduct criminalized by this statute necessarily 
involved dishonesty as an essential element.”10  This petition 
for review followed.  Although we reject the BIA’s 
interpretation of § 1028A(a)(1), we will deny the petition and 
hold that Sasay’s aggavated identify theft conviction is a 
CIMT. In doing so, we apply the modified categorical 
approach, consulting his plea agreement to ascertain which 
alternative element—or here, which alternative felony 
violation—formed the basis of his conviction. Sasay’s plea 
agreement readily establishes that his conviction has as an 
element the commission of bank fraud, in violation of § 18 
U.S.C. § 1344. Because bank fraud categorically qualifies as a 
 
7 A.R. at 678. 
8 Appx. at 6 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 





CIMT, so too must Sasay’s aggravated identity theft 
conviction. 
 
B. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final removal 
order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  There are statutory 
exceptions to our jurisdiction to review final removal orders of 
people convicted of a CIMT under § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, 
they do not apply here because Sasay raises a question of law 
under the § 1252(a)(2)(D) exception to (a)(2)(C).  
 
When “the BIA issues a written decision on the merits, 
we review its decision and not the decision of the IJ.”11  We 
defer to the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude and whether a 
crime can be categorized as a CIMT, as long as its 
determination is reasonable and “based on a permissible 
interpretation of the immigration statute.”12  However, 
unpublished, non-precedential, BIA decisions issued by a 
single member panel are not entitled to such deference.13  Our 




“A noncitizen is removable from the United States if he 
has been ‘convicted of two or more crimes involving moral 
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct.’”15  Sasay concedes that his conviction under 
Virginia law qualifies but argues that his conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) does not.     
 
11 Hernandez-Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d 
Cir. 2014)). 
12 Larios v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(quoting Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal quotations omitted)). 
13 Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). 
14 Hernandez-Cruz, 764 F.3d at 284. 





The Supreme Court has instructed that we must apply 
the so-called “categorical approach” to determine if a given 
crime is a CIMT.  That approach requires that we ignore a 
petitioner’s actual conduct and instead “focus[] on the legal 
question of what a conviction necessarily establishe[s].”16  
This approach is, the Court has said, “[r]ooted in Congress’ 
specification of conviction, not conduct, as the trigger for 
immigration consequences, [and] is [therefore] suited to the 
realities of the [immigration] system.”17   
 
To apply the categorical approach, we first review 
“elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s 
conviction,”18 in order “to ascertain the least culpable conduct 
hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the 
statute.”19 We then consider whether that conduct “fall[s] 
within the scope of the ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ 
offense.”20 Sometimes, however, “[t]he simple fact of 
conviction may not provide enough information to determine 
whether” a defendant’s conviction is a CIMT.21 Specifically, 
when a statute is divisible, meaning it “sets out one or more 
elements of the offense in the alternative,”22 that statute 
effectively creates several different crimes.23 And if some but 
not all of the divisible statute’s alternative crimes qualify as a 
CIMT, then “a court must determine which crime formed the 
basis of the defendant’s conviction” using the modified 
categorical approach.24 
 
Under the modified approach, we may “consult a 
limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative 
formed the basis of the defendant’s . . . conviction.”25 “[We] 
can then do what the categorical approach demands: compare 
 
16 Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015) (emphasis in 
original). 
17 Id. 
18 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).  
19 Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2009).  
20 Id. at 482 (citation omitted).  
21 United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2011).  
22 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.  
23 Id. at 263-64.  
24 Id. at 263; see also Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 187. 




the elements of the crime of conviction (including the 
alternative element used in the case) with the generic” 
definition of the removable offense.26 When properly applied, 
this modified categorical approach “acts not as an exception, 
but instead a tool.”27 
 
 The modified approach clearly applies to § 1028A 
because it incorporates several felonies enumerated in 
subsection (c).28  Those felonies represent alternative elements 
 
26 Id. at 257. 
27 Id. at 263. 
28 A “felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)” includes 
any offense in violation of-- 
(1) section 641 (relating to theft of public 
money, property, or re[co]rds), section 
656 (relating to theft, embezzlement, or 
misapplication by bank officer or employee), 
or section 664 (relating to theft from employee 
benefit plans); 
(2) section 911 (relating to false personation of 
citizenship); 
(3) section 922(a)(6) (relating to false 
statements in connection with the acquisition of 
a firearm); 
(4) any provision contained in this chapter 
(relating to fraud and false statements), other 
than this section or section 1028(a)(7); 
(5) any provision contained in chapter 63 
(relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud); 
(6) any provision contained in chapter 69 
(relating to nationality and citizenship); 
(7) any provision contained in chapter 75 
(relating to passports and visas); 
(8) section 523 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(15 U.S.C. 6823) (relating to obtaining 
customer information by false pretenses); 
(9) section 243 or 266 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253 and 1306) 
(relating to willfully failing to leave the United 
States after deportation and creating a 





for an aggravated identity theft conviction because a jury could 
not convict a defendant under § 1028A(a)(1) without finding 
each element of the underlying felony violation and 
unanimously agreeing on that violation as the predicate felony 
for an aggravated identify theft conviction.29  Accordingly, § 
1028A is divisible and we must use the modified categorical 
approach.   
 
This approach permits us to consult Sasay’s plea 
agreement to ascertain which alternative element of a crime he 
committed.  It is clear from that agreement that this plea 
includes admission to conduct constituting the predicate felony 
of bank fraud—an undeniable CIMT and a crime specifically 
enumerated in § 1028A(c)(5).30  That, by itself is sufficient to 
support the BIA’s ruling that Sasay’s 1028A(a)(1) conviction 
constituted a CIMT because it requires fraudulent intent.  The 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement more than half a century ago 
that “[f]raud is the touchstone by which this case should be 
judged”31 ends our inquiry.  Although the Court was there 
addressing a different statute, it was nevertheless intepreting 
 
(10) any provision contained in chapter 8 of title 
II of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1321 et seq.) (relating to various 
immigration offenses); or 
(11) section 208, 811, 1107(b), 1128B(a), or 
1632 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
408, 1011, 1307(b), 1320a-7b(a), and 1383a) 
(relating to false statements relating to programs 
under the Act). 
29 See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817-22 
(1999) (“A ‘violation’ is not simply an act or conduct; it is an 
act or conduct that is contrary to law. That circumstance is 
significant because the criminal law ordinarily entrusts a jury 
with determining whether alleged conduct ‘violates’ the law.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 186-88.  
30A.R. at 755-56. A person is guilty of bank fraud if he: 
“knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice--(1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain 
any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other 
property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a 
financial institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 1344. 




the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.”  The Court there 
held: “[t]he phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ has 
without exception been constructed to embrace fraudulent 
conduct.”32 
 
As noted earlier, Sasay claims his conviction does not 
amount to a CIMT because under the broad reach of § 
1028A(a)(1), he could be convicted of “mere possession of 
someone else’s identity document without lawful authority.”33  
According to him, a statute that criminalizes mere 
unauthorized possession of documents cannot be morally 
turpitudinous.  The argument lacks even superficial appeal.   
 
The statute does not criminalize mere possession of 
certain items.  His argument to the contrary ignores that the 
more exacting statutory language requires that such 
unauthorized possession be “during and in relation to any 
felony” enumerated in subsection (c) of the statute.  That 
means that Sasay’s unauthorized possession of documents 
aided and abetted certain felonies specifically listed in 
subsection (c) by possessing the documents.  
 
Sasay argues that we must ignore his specific conduct 
because this statute is indivisible and therefore the categorical 
approach applies.  He then argues the minimum conduct 
criminalized by § 1028A(a)(1) is the mere possession of an 
unauthorized identity document, which cannot be a CIMT.  As 
we have just explained, the statute does not criminalize “mere” 
possession or transfer.  Rather, the possession and transfer 
must be in relation to an enumerated felony.   It is therefore 
consequential that he admitted that his possession was 




Section 1028A(a)(1) criminalizes transfer, use, or 
possession in conjuction with one of the eleven categories of 
crimes listed in subsection (c).  The enumerated offenses 
relevent to Sasay are included in (c)(5) and (c)(7), which refer 
to offenses in violation of  “(5) any provision contained in 
 
32 Id. 




chapter 63 (relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud); . . . [and] 
(7) any provision contained in chapter 75 (relating to passports 
and visas) . . . .”34   
In Matter of Serna, the BIA found that possession of an 
altered identity document in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (a 
crime also enumerated in subsection (c)(7)) was not a CIMT. 
35 Sasay seizes on that here, just as he did before the BIA. The 
BIA properly distinguished Matter of Serna.  The asylum 
petitioner there had been convicted of possession of an altered 
immigration document in violation of § 1546,36 and Sasay 
correctly notes that that statute is included in the offenses 
specified in subsection (c) as a predicate offense to violating § 
1028A(a)(1).37  However, the analogy ends there.  As the BIA 
recognized, one can violate § 1546 simply by knowingly 
possessing altered immigration documents and the statute does 
not require that possession be accompanied by the intent to 
defraud or another crime involving moral turpitude.  As we 
have already explained, Sasay’s conviction under § 
1028A(a)(1) is different because it required that his possession 
was during and in relation to the predicate felony of bank fraud.  
Sasay also points to several other BIA decisions as well 
as decisions by other Circuit Courts of Appeals “involving 
 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). 
35 Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 1992). 
36 The relevant part of the statute states:  
 
Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, 
or falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant 
visa, permit, or other document required for 
entry into the United States, or utters, uses, 
attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or 
receives any such visa, permit, or document, 
knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or 
falsely made, or to have been procured by means 
of any false claim or statement, or to have been 
otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully 
obtained ... [s]hall be fined not more than $2,000 
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 1546. See Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. at 853. 
37 Section 1546 falls in to § 1028A(c)(7) as a provision of 




dishonesty,” which were found not to be CIMTs.38  The 
authorities he relies upon, like Matter of Serna, are all 
distinguishable for the reason we just explained.  Essentially, 
Sasay’s argument requires that we read “during and in relation 




For the reasons set forth above, this petition for review 
must be resolved using the modified categorical approach.  We 
therefore consider that Sasay pled guilty to violating §1028A 
with the predicate felony of bank fraud and therefore convicted 
of a CIMT.  Since this conviction is Sasay’s second CIMT, the 
 
38 Petitioner’s Br. at 24. See Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 
693, 696-700 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding Petitioner’s conviction 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542 was not a categorical CIMT 
and the government failed to establish a CIMT under the 
modified categorical approach); In re Zangwill, 18 I. & N. 
Dec. 22, 28 (BIA 1981) (finding passing bad checks with 
knowledge of insufficient funds in violation of Florida state 
law to not be a CIMT because conviction does not require 
showing intent to defraud); Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 
1179, 1183-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding false attestation on an 
I-9 form in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(b)(3) and use of a 
false social security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
408(a)(7)(B) to not be CIMTs and not inherently wrong acts); 
Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(finding the petitioner’s conviction of false identification to a 
police officer in violation of Minnesota state law to not be a 
CIMT when applying the modified categorical approach); 
Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150, 1167–69 (10th Cir. 
2017) (finding giving false information to an official during 
an investigation in violation of a city ordinance to not be a 
CIMT because the statement does not have to be material nor 
does it have to be given with the intent to cause harm or 
obtain benefit); Matter of S-, 2 I&N Dec. 353 (BIA, A.G. 
1945) (finding knowingly making false statements – not 
amounting to perjury, on an immigrant  registration 
application – is not a CIMT); and Rivera v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 
1064, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding written perjury in 
violation of California law is not a CIMT applying the 




BIA did not err in concluding that he is removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii).   
 
For the reasons we have discussed, Sasay’s petition for 
review will be denied. 
